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SUMMARY
Effective use of data linkage is becoming an increasingly important focus in the new healthcare
system in England. We linked data from the results of a multiplex PCR assay for respiratory
viruses for a population of 230 inpatients at a UK teaching hospital with their patient
administrative system records in order to compare the mortality and length of stay of patients
who tested positive for inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 with those positive for another inﬂuenza A
virus. The results indicated a reduced risk of death among inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 patients
compared to other inﬂuenza A strains, with an adjusted risk ratio of 0·25 (95% conﬁdence
interval 0·08–0·75, P = 0·01), while no signiﬁcant differences were found between the lengths of
stay in the hospital for these two groups. Further development of such methods to link hospital
data in a routine fashion could provide a rapid means of gaining epidemiological insights into
emerging infectious diseases.
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Linkage of electronic health records to connect infor-
mation across disparate sources can represent a valu-
able tool for medical and population health research
[1]. The importance of exploiting such tools has
been highlighted numerous times during the develop-
ment of the new healthcare system in England:
Public Health England included improved data shar-
ing as one of its key priorities for strengthening public
health surveillance [2], and NHS England and the
Health and Social Care Information Centre are aim-
ing to link data for patients across health and social
care systems through the development of the care.
data service [3]. However, the process of linking data-
sets that have not been designed with this objective in
mind can be complex, as there is not always a con-
sistent unique identiﬁer that can be used to match a
record from one database to a corresponding record
for the same patient (or encounter, depending on the
purpose), in another database. Data structures often
differ, requiring multiple entries to be matched to a
single row in another database, and completeness of
key linking ﬁelds is not always prioritized in data
entry.
When the pandemic inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09
virus emerged in 2009, uncertainty regarding its nat-
ure and severity prompted efforts to rapidly determine
the burden of mortality and morbidity associated with
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the strain [4]. In this study, we aimed to demonstrate
how linkage of routinely collected hospital data
could be used to address this question and similar
and population-level concerns.
This was a retrospective study of a group of inpati-
ents at a UK teaching hospital who tested positive for
an inﬂuenza A virus by multiplex PCR between
November 2007 and December 2012. Laboratory
multiplex PCR results were linked to their results in
a second genotyping database to determine viral sub-
types. Corresponding records were also identiﬁed in
the Patient Administration System (PAS), allowing
identiﬁcation of inpatients, the reason for their
admission, discharge destination, and admission and
discharge dates. Microsoft SQL Server 2005
(Microsoft Corp., USA) was used to perform the link-
age, based on patients’ hospital numbers, names and
hospital spell identiﬁcation numbers (an identiﬁer for
the continuous stay of a patient in a hospital).
Deaths were identiﬁed using the discharge destination
ﬁeld, and length of stay following a positive inﬂuenza
A test was calculated using the testing and discharge
dates.
The multiplex PCR assay for respiratory viruses
used at this hospital includes a pentaplex inﬂuenza
A/B/A(H1N1)pdm09/H3 detection and typing real-
time assay with an internal control, which has been
detailed previously [5, 6], with additional multiplex
real-time (Taqman) PCR assays to detect other
common respiratory viruses including respiratory syn-
cytial viruses (RSV) A and B, parainﬂuenza types 1–4,
adenovirus, enterovirus, rhinovirus, human meta-
pneumovirus, group 1 coronaviruses (HCoV-229E
and HCoV-NL63), group 2 coronaviruses, and
SARS-associated coronavirus [7].
Distributions of mortality and length of stay follow-
ing a positive inﬂuenza A test were compared for
(H1N1)pdm09 and other inﬂuenza A cases, and rela-
tionships assessed using univariable and multivariable
log-binomial regression analyses as appropriate.
The study population comprised 243 patients who
tested positive for inﬂuenza A, from a total of 4895
inpatients who had a multiplex respiratory PCR test
during their admission between November 2007 and
December 2012. Successful linkages between the mul-
tiplex PCR, genotype, and PAS databases were
obtained for all records with the exception of 13
patients who tested positive for inﬂuenza A but for
whom no genotyping results were available and were
therefore excluded from the analysis. Linkages were
achieved based on the combination of hospital
numbers and hospital spell identiﬁers and checked
manually using names. A total of 160 (70%) of the
230 included patients had inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09,
with the remaining 70 testing positive for another
inﬂuenza A strain, including 62 H3 and eight non-
pandemic H1 isolates which typed as the seasonal
H1N1 strain circulating prior to and during the
early phase of the pandemic in 2009.
Five inﬂuenza seasons were included in the data.
The pandemic H1N1(pdm09) strain ﬁrst arose in the
2008/2009 season, and predominated for the next
two seasons, until 2011/2012 in which no H1N1
cases were detected.
About half (118, 51%) of the patients were male
and the median age was 34·5 years [inter-quartile
range (IQR) 10–67·5 years]. The majority of the
patients (182, 79%) were admitted for a respiratory
reason, and 32 (14%) tested positive for at least one
other respiratory virus. Of these, ﬁve had one
co-infection, 26 had two co-infections and one had
three co-infections; the most common co-infecting
viruses were rhinovirus and RSV (11 and 10 patients,
respectively).
A total of 13 patients in the population died while
in hospital. These fatalities included four (2·5%) of
the 160 patients with H1N1 inﬂuenza A, and nine
(13%) of the 70 patients with non-H1N1 inﬂuenza
A. The results of the univariable and multivariable
log-binomial regression analyses for the outcome of
death are shown in Table 1. The crude risk ratio
(RR) for death following an infection with inﬂuenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 compared to other inﬂuenza A
viruses was 0·19 [95% conﬁdence interval (CI) 0·06–
0·61, P< 0·01]. A larger proportion of patients aged
565 years died, with a RR of 16·5 (95% CI 2·17–
126·2, P< 0·01) compared to the baseline group
(those aged 0–16 years). There were non-signiﬁcant
associations between male sex and reduced risk of
death (RR 0·42, 95% CI 0·13–1·33, P = 0·13), and be-
tween presence of a co-infection and increased risk of
death (RR 1·13, 95% CI 0·26–4·84, P = 0·88). None of
the 48 patients who were admitted for a non-
respiratory reason died.
Multivariable analysis was performed adjusting for
age, as a signiﬁcant covariate, and sex, as an a priori
confounder, but not co-infection or reason for ad-
mission as they were not signiﬁcantly associated with
death at univariable analysis. The adjusted RR for
inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 increased to 0·25 (95% CI
0·08–0·75, P = 0·01), which suggests that the crude
RR was partially confounded by these factors.
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The median lengths of stay in the hospital following
a positive test for inﬂuenza A among patients with
inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and other inﬂuenza A
viruses were 3 days (IQR 1–9 days) and 4 days (IQR
2–12 days), respectively. Inspection of the distribu-
tions did not suggest any differences between these
groups, and a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test
conﬁrmed that the distributions were not signiﬁcantly
different (P = 0·32).
This study was the ﬁrst analysis of linked multiplex
respiratory virus PCR and patient administration sys-
tem data from this hospital. The successful linkage of
these datasets allowed the detailed virological infor-
mation that had been collected over ﬁve inﬂuenza sea-
sons to be enriched with demographic and clinical
data in order to address this important epidemiologi-
cal problem.
The results provided evidence that inﬂuenza A
(H1N1)pdm09 was less severe in terms of mortality
than other inﬂuenza A viruses, with a risk of death
about one quarter that of seasonal inﬂuenza A. No
signiﬁcant differences were found in the lengths of
stay in the hospital for these two groups. These results
are consistent with other reports that the pandemic
strain was less severe than initially anticipated [8],
and did not result in as many deaths as other inﬂuenza
pandemics in the 20th century [9, 10].
The case-fatality ratio (CFR) in this population for
pandemic inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was 2·5%. Since
this study concerned hospitalized patients only, it is
not surprising that this value exceeds some other
reported values, such as the estimated CFR in the
UK from the ﬁrst year of the pandemic of 0·04% [11],
which was calculated using estimated number of clinical
cases from surveillance data as the denominator and
number of deaths associated with inﬂuenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 as the numerator. A recent review [12] identiﬁed
a wide range of published CFRs from this pandemic,
with higher estimates from hospitalized cases, and a
tenfold increase in the CFR for those requiring inten-
sive care compared to all symptomatic cases.
There were a number of limitations to this study
which impact on its generalizability to other inﬂuenza
A patient populations. First, although the reason for
admission could be classiﬁed as respiratory or non-
respiratory, there was not enough clinical information
available to generate an accurate measure of underly-
ing conditions in the patients, which therefore could
not be controlled for in the analysis. Previous studies
have indicated that factors such as pregnancy, immu-
nosuppression and neurological disorders [13], are
related to severe infection and would therefore be im-
portant to consider. Bacterial co-infections have also
been associated with fatal cases of inﬂuenza A
(H1N1)pdm09 infection [14], a ﬁnding that could be
assessed through linkage with other routinely col-
lected hospital laboratory data, although full reviews
of clinical notes would be required to provide a
complete understanding of the pre-existing medical
conditions.
Table 1. Univariable and multivariable analyses for effect of inﬂuenza A strain type on risk of death among inpatients
testing positive for inﬂuenza A at a UK teaching hospital, November 2007 to December 2012
Total Died
Univariable analysis Multivariable analysis
Variable Level (N = 230) (N = 13) % RR 95% CI P aRR 95% CI P
Inﬂuenza A
virus
Non-H1N1* 70 9 12·85 Base — — — — —
(H1N1)pdm09 160 4 2·50 0·19 0·06–0·61 <0·01 0·25 0·08–0·75 0·01
Age, years 0–16 62 1 1·61 Base — — — — —
17–64 138 4 2·90 1·80 0·21–15·75 0·60 2·34 0·27–20·60 0·44
565 30 8 26·67 16·5 2·17–126·22 <0·01 14·09 1·83–108·43 0·01
Sex Female 112 9 8·04 Base — — — — —
Male 118 4 3·39 0·42 0·13–1·33 0·13 0·58 0·21–1·60 0·29
Co-infection† No 198 11 5·56 Base — — — — —
Yes 32 2 6·25 1·13 0·26–4·84 0·88 — — —
Reason for
admission
Respiratory 182 13 7·14 — — — — — —
Non-Respiratory 48 0 0 — — — — — —
RR, Risk ratio; CI, conﬁdence interval; aRR, adjusted risk ratio (multivariable log-binomial regression of effect of inﬂuenza
A strain type on risk of death, adjusted for age and sex)
* Non-H1N1, any inﬂuenza A virus except (H1N1)2009
† Co-infection, positive test for any other respiratory virus by multiplex PCR
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Second, the mortality outcome was calculated
using only the patient discharge destination, and
therefore captured only patients who died while in
hospital. Linkage to death registers would enable bet-
ter understanding of the possible effects of these virus
strains on mortality, but this was beyond the scope of
this study.
Third, the data collected were limited to inpatients
at one teaching hospital across ﬁve inﬂuenza seasons.
The study population is therefore not representative
of the entire population of patients with inﬂuenza
A across these seasons, as inpatients at this hospital
are likely to have more severe disease than non-
inpatients, and may have complicated pre-existing
conditions.
Finally, there was a potential admission bias in
this study: during the pandemic, public awareness of
inﬂuenza was heightened, and, although public health
advice recommended that symptomatic individuals
stay at home [15], it is possible that there were relaxed
admission standards during the ﬁrst phase of the
pandemic. More liberal admission criteria could
have led to an increase in the number of non-severe
cases admitted compared to other inﬂuenza seasons
and therefore contributed to the observed association
with reduced mortality. However, no formal policy to
this effect was introduced at this hospital, and such a
situation would also be likely to lead to a reduction in
the average length of stay, which was not detected
here.
In spite of these limitations, the association between
inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 H1N1 and reduced mor-
tality among inﬂuenza A patients was strong, and
provides further evidence that this strain of inﬂuenza
was not as severe as was ﬁrst feared. Moreover, this
analysis emphasizes the value of combining databases
of electronic healthcare records to make the best use
of routinely collected data. Further development of
such data linkage methods in a routine fashion
could provide a rapid means of gaining valuable
epidemiological insights into emerging infectious
diseases.
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